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Abstract 
It is well established in the long-term development literature that deeply rooted institutions are 
the fundamental drivers of comparative prosperity across the world. This study contributes to 
this line of inquiry by investigating the extent to which the quality of institutions helps shape 
international differences in economic complexity – a novel measure of productive capabilities. 
More specifically, economic complexity corresponds to an enhanced capacity to produce and 
export a diverse range of sophisticated (high-productivity) products, which is highly predictive 
of future patterns of growth and development. The central hypothesis is that institutions are 
linked to higher degrees of economic complexity via strengthening incentives for innovative 
entrepreneurship, fostering human capital accumulation, and directing human resources 
towards productive activities. Employing data for up to 115 countries, I consistently obtain 
precise estimates of the positive effects of institutional quality, measured by the Economic 
Freedom of the World Index, on economic complexity. The findings highlight the important 
role of establishing well-functioning institutions in driving structural transformation towards 
productive activities, which contributes to alleviating the persistence of underdevelopment. 
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One of the most intriguing and difficult questions in economics is “why are some countries 
more affluent than others?” Several influential contributions to this body of research postulate 
that economic complexity helps explain the worldwide distribution of long-term economic 
growth (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2011; Hausmann et al., 2014; 
Hidalgo, 2021). Accordingly, complex economies producing (and exporting) a diverse range 
of sophisticated (high-productivity) products, including automobiles, electronics, and 
chemicals, are more likely to experience sustained growth (Felipe et al., 2012; Hidalgo, 2021). 
By contrast, countries whose economic structures comprise of less complex (low-productivity) 
products, such as raw materials, wood, and textiles, tend to suffer from persistent 
underdevelopment.1 More specifically, economic complexity provides an internationally 
comparable measure of productive capabilities based on the mix of products embedded in a 
country’s economic structures (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). The underlying intuition is that 
an enhanced ability to produce a variety of sophisticated products, typically characterized by 
high and increasing returns, reflects the amount of productive knowledge within an economy 
(Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Felipe et al., 2012; Hidalgo, 2021).   
Recent studies find suggestive evidence that economic complexity matters for many 
economic outcomes. For example, Hartmann et al. (2017) and Lee and Vu (2020) reveal that 
economic complexity is associated with less income inequality. Using international and 
subnational data, several papers empirically establish a positive association between 
complexity and the rates of economic growth (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Zhu & Li, 2017; 
Gao & Zhou, 2018). Other scholars put forward that complex economies enjoy better health 
outcomes (Vu, 2020), higher workers’ share of income (Arif, 2021), and lower levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions per capita (Romero & Gramkow, 2021).2 Overall, the existing 
literature reveals that economic complexity is a key determinant of cross-country comparative 
development. Therefore, a better understanding of the root causes of international differences 
in complexity plays an important role in formulating relevant policies that help alleviate the 
persistence of underdevelopment in many parts the world. This provides the motivation for 
investigating factors shaping the evolution of economic complexity. 
                                                          
1 This line of inquiry draws upon a long-standing viewpoint emphasizing the important role of structural 
transformation, by which resources are transferred from low-productivity industries toward high-productivity 
ones, in driving comparative economic performance (see, among others, Lewis, 1955; Rostow, 1959; Kuznets & 
Murphy, 1966; Kaldor, 1967; Chenery & Taylor, 1968). 
2 Hidalgo (2021) provides a review of studies examining the causes and consequences of economic complexity.  
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As reviewed by Hidalgo (2021), there exist several empirical attempts at establishing the 
driving forces of economic complexity, including, but not limited to, internet usage (Lapatinas, 
2019), security of property rights (Sweet & Maggio, 2015), foreign direct investment (Zhu & 
Fu, 2013; Kannen, 2020), human capital accumulation (Hausmann et al., 2007), R&D 
investment (Zhu & Fu, 2013), and demographic characteristics (Vu, 2021b). Previous studies 
have predominantly established a mere correlation between economic complexity and 
development outcomes (see, for example, Hartmann et al., 2017; Hidalgo, 2021). Nevertheless, 
empirical estimation of the drivers of economic complexity in the aforementioned studies 
requires attention to selection on unobservables, reverse causality and measurement issues. In 
this regard, identification critically depends on isolating plausibly exogenous sources of 
variation in the determinants of economic complexity. It is important to note that the use of the 
aforementioned ‘proximate’ determinants of development to explain the worldwide 
distribution of economic complexity is unsatisfactory from a theoretical perspective. For 
example, foreign investment, income levels and economic complexity are interrelated with and 
jointly determined by each other, making it difficult to identify the root causes of complexity. 
Considering these concerns, I draw on a parallel and well-established line of research 
positing that institutions are the fundamental determinants of economic performance. The 
institutional theory of comparative development can be traced back to the seminal contribution 
of North (1990, p. 3) who views institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or, more 
formally, … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. Good institutions, 
reflected in security of property rights or competitive markets, affect the relative returns to 
different productive and non-productive economic activities. Hence, the quality of institutions 
fundamentally drives investments in human and physical capital and innovative activities, 
leading to substantial and persistent variation in income per capita across the world. It is 
noteworthy that poor-quality economic or political institutions remain an enduring feature of 
many societies throughout the globe, widely attributed to a country’s geographic or historical 
characteristics (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Nikolaev & Salahodjaev, 
2017; Vu, 2021c).3 Hence, the persistence of underdevelopment has its deep roots from slowly 
evolving institutions (Nunn, 2020; Maseland, 2021). It is argued that deeply rooted institutional 
factors may provide a more fundamental explanation for substantial and persistent differences 
                                                          
3 An influential study by Acemoglu et al. (2001) proposes that Europeans adopted different colonization strategies 
depending on the disease environment of former colonies. In places where Europeans could healthily settle, they 
established inclusive institutions. In contrast, where the disease environment was unfavourable for Europeans to 
settle permanently, they set up extractive institutions. The early colonial institutions persist until today. 
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in economic complexity across countries (Vu, 2019). This motivates an exploration of the 
contribution of institutions to shaping the global pattern of economic complexity.  
Numerous studies have empirically established that institutions are the deep determinants 
of comparative economic performance, commonly measured by income per head (Easterly & 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2005; 
Acemoglu et al., 2014). There exists a strong consensus among economists and policymakers 
that economic prosperity tends to proliferate in societies with inclusive (good) institutions. 
However, establishing pro-development institutions arguably hinges on our understanding of 
the underlying pathways through which institutions affect global income differences. This 
paper sheds light on this inquiry by demonstrating the importance of well-functioning 
institutions in fostering structural transformation towards productive activities. 
Specifically, the theory of economic complexity highlights the important role of the types 
of products embedded in a country’s economic structures for future prospects of development 
(Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Hidalgo, 2021). Specializing in different products is associated 
with the global divergence in economic performance, mainly attributed to considerable 
variation in income elasticities and returns across a variety of products (Felipe et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Hidalgo et al. (2007) attempt to measure the degree of connectedness between 
products based on so-called product space theory. It is suggested that complex economies 
specializing in sophisticated products find it easier to diversify into other related high-
productivity activities. A key explanation is that sophisticated products, located at the centre 
of the product space, are densely connected to other productive activities due to similarities in 
productive capabilities required for production (Hidalgo et al., 2007).4 By contrast, the 
production of less sophisticated products is less connected with other productive activities, 
making it difficult to sustain economic growth through structural transformation (Hidalgo et 
al., 2007). Therefore, the ability to produce and export a wide range of sophisticated products 
is highly predictive of future patterns of economic growth. Although economic complexity is 
strongly correlated with GDP per capita, these metrics differ considerably in their predictive 
power of future growth and development. Such information may not be properly captured by 
the current level of income per capita for many societies. For example, Chile and Malaysia 
                                                          
4 As put forward by Hidalgo et al. (2007), the relatedness/proximity between two products is captured by 
similarities in productive capabilities or knowledge, including technologies, skills, infrastructure, legal systems 
and tacit knowledge. For instance, the overall affinity between apples and pears would be greater than that between 
apples and iPhones (Hidalgo et al., 2007). This is represented by the product space theory, in which sophisticated 
products are densely connected to many other economic activities. 
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differ substantially in terms of economic complexity despite their comparable levels of income 
per capita. The divergence in economic complexity translates into significant differences in the 
rates of economic growth and income distribution between these two economies (Hartmann et 
al., 2017). Vu (2020) argues that the variation in economic complexity between Bangladesh 
and Vietnam helps explain their significant discrepancies in mortality rates and life expectancy, 
which is not captured by GDP per person or trade openness. Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) 
demonstrate that countries endowed with greater productive capabilities may sustain growth 
over prolonged periods, possibly ending up wealthier in the future (Hidalgo, 2021). 
In general, income levels are a measure of existing comparative cross-country 
development, whereas economic complexity is developed to elaborate predictions of future 
economic growth based on the availability of productive capabilities (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 
2009; Hidalgo, 2021). While the extent to which institutions help explain existing global 
income differences is well documented, this study goes beyond earlier studies by uncovering 
whether and through which mechanisms institutions could attenuate the persistence of 
underdevelopment in many parts of the world. Exploring the hypothesized positive effects of 
institutions on economic complexity, I advocate for establishing a pro-development 
institutional environment. The findings are especially relevant for many developing economies 
characterized by widespread and persistent constraints to eliminating poor institutions and/or 
weak governance.  
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest that a country’s 
economic complexity depends on the number of entrepreneurs engaged in the cost discovery 
process, based on the so-called ‘self-discovery’ theory. Specifically, acquiring new productive 
capabilities, achieved by discovering the underlying cost structure of an economy, typically 
entails high degrees of cost uncertainties incurred by pioneering entrepreneurs. However, it 
potentially creates positive externalities upon successful completion (Hausmann & Rodrik, 
2003). Hence, structural change in a country’s economic structures is driven by entrepreneurial 
investments in uncovering the cost structure because it provides important insights into the 
types of products that can be produced profitably in the domestic market (Hausmann et al., 
2007). Building upon these ideas, I hypothesize that inclusive institutions, including security 
of property rights and enforcement of laws, contracts and regulations, deploy greater 
entrepreneurial investment in the cost discovery process. This is because societies with good 
institutions are able to internalize the externalities of the cost discovery process, thereby 
increasing economic complexity (Hausmann et al., 2007). Moreover, I contend that 
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institutional quality is associated with higher degrees of economic complexity through 
strengthening human capital accumulation and allocating human resources towards productive 
activities (Natkhov & Polishchuk, 2019). 
Using data for up to 115 world economies, this research establishes that institutions, 
captured by the Economic Freedom of the World Index, exert a positive influence on economic 
complexity. In order to provide a valid basis for consistent inference, I assess the importance 
of selection on unobservables in accounting for the hypothesized positive association between 
institutions and complexity. Moreover, I attempt to isolate exogenous sources of variation in 
institutions that help explain international differences in economic complexity. The IV results 
also withstand several analyses on the validity of the exclusion restriction and the relevance of 
the instruments. In line with Acemoglu et al. (2014), I document suggestive evidence of the 
primacy of institutions, relative to human capital accumulation, in shaping the persistence of 
underdevelopment across the globe. The empirical estimates derived from a mediation analysis 
lend credence to the proposed mechanism underlying the relationship between institutional 
quality and economic complexity, which is consistent with the central hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework, 
followed by a description of data and key variables in Section 3. Section 4 presents 
identification methods. The empirical findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 delves 
deeper into the roles of institutions vs. human capital in shaping the evolution of economic 
complexity and potential mechanisms underlying the main findings. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the quality of institutions imparts a positive 
influence on economic complexity. More specifically, countries endowed with well-
functioning institutions tend to accumulate greater productive capabilities, reflected in their 
ability to produce and export a diverse range of sophisticated (high-productivity) products. By 
contrast, societies where poor-quality institutions persist are likely to establish economic 
structures characterized by a limited range of unsophisticated (low-productivity) products. 
There exists ample evidence that the types of products embedded in a country’s economic 
structures matter for long-term economic performance (Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo & 
Hausmann, 2009; Hartmann et al., 2017; Vu, 2020). Several major contributions to this body 
of research put an emphasis on the role of cost uncertainties associated with the process of 
acquiring or discovering new productive capabilities in driving the global pattern of 
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specialization (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2007). Accordingly, Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2003) postulate that economic development is a ‘self-discovery’ process, in which 
a country learns to transform itself from low-productivity activities to high-productivity ones. 
Specifically, the ‘self-discovery’ process refers to attempts at uncovering the underlying cost 
structure of an economy by pioneering investors (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). This process 
facilitates structural transformation towards new productive activities by providing other 
entrepreneurs with useful information about certain products that can be produced profitably 
domestically (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). Nevertheless, countries differ substantially in the 
path of structural transformation, depending on the number of entrepreneurs engaged in the 
‘self-discovery’ process (Hausmann et al., 2007). On this basis, the level of economic 
complexity is critically driven by the number of entrepreneurs pioneering in discovering the 
underlying cost structure of an economy (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2007).  
Investment in cost discoveries typically creates positive externalities because other 
entrepreneurs can emulate such discoveries to produce new products (Hausmann & Rodrik, 
2003; Hausmann et al., 2007). However, Hausmann et al. (2007) highlight that an entrepreneur 
who participates in new economic activities, particularly in the developing world, incurs 
significant cost uncertainties prevailing in a poorly understood field. This helps explain why 
the mix of products embedded in a country’s economic structures depends on the number of 
entrepreneurs who are stimulated to pioneer in cost discoveries. In this regard, well-functioning 
institutions, including security of property rights and enforcement of contracts, laws and 
regulations, are likely key drivers of investment in the ‘self-discovery’ process. This is because 
countries characterized by good institutions are able to internalize the externalities of cost 
discoveries, thus directing investments towards productive activities (Hausmann et al., 2007). 
More specifically, inclusive institutions secure private property and reward pioneering 
entrepreneurs (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990), thereby deploying entrepreneurial resources in the 
‘self-discovery’ process. In contrast, poor-quality institutions provide greater returns to 
(existing) rent-seeking activities of an economy, relative to acquiring new productive 
capabilities (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990; Murphy et al., 1993). The persistence of weak 
institutions, therefore, directs entrepreneurship away from the ‘self-discovery’ process.  
Building upon the ‘self-discovery’ theory of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et 
al. (2007), I argue that strong institutions transmit to higher degrees of economic complexity 
by fostering innovative entrepreneurship in acquiring new productive capabilities. 
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In addition, I propose that institutions give rise to economic complexity through 
promoting human capital accumulation and the deployment of human resources in productive 
activities. Endogenous growth theory emphasizes the role of human capital in driving economic 
performance. In line with this long-standing viewpoint, improvements in economic 
complexity, achieved by acquiring new productive capabilities and resource transformation 
towards productive activities, are arguably reinforced by the quality of human capital 
(Hausmann et al., 2014; Zhu & Li, 2017; Lapatinas & Litina, 2019; Lee & Vu, 2020; Vu, 2020). 
The underlying idea is that countries endowed with a more educated workforce can learn and 
acquire new productive knowledge faster, ceteris paribus (Costinot, 2009; Zhu & Li, 2017; 
Lapatinas & Litina, 2019). As argued by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), the production of 
sophisticated products requires a variety of hard-to-find capabilities, and the accumulation of 
such productive capabilities is contingent on the pool of talents within an economy. By 
contrast, low degrees of human capital accumulation plausibly hold back structural 
transformation of a country’s economic structures (Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo & 
Hausmann, 2009; Zhu & Li, 2017; Vu, 2020). Moreover, the quality of human capital affects 
the extent to which a country can exploit accumulated (existing) productive capabilities, 
thereby driving the pattern of specialization (Zhu & Fu, 2013; Zhu & Li, 2017; Vu, 2020). 
It is also widely acknowledged that good institutions are key driving forces of human 
capital accumulation and the allocation of human resources between productive and non-
productive activities (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Acemoglu, 1995; 
Natkhov & Polishchuk, 2019). In particular, institutional quality helps foster investment in 
human capital via offering higher returns to accumulating knowledge and education (Dias & 
Tebaldi, 2012). Additionally, well-functioning institutions, by rewarding high-productivity 
activities, deploy human resources towards the production of sophisticated products (Baumol, 
1990). Meanwhile, rent-seeking activities, which tend to proliferate in societies with poor-
quality institutions, offer higher returns to human capital investment in non-productive 
activities (Murphy et al., 1991; Acemoglu, 1995; Natkhov & Polishchuk, 2019). Thus, marker-
supporting institutions plausibly contribute to an efficient allocation of human resources. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of institutions on economic complexity. Consistent with 
the above discussion, I propose that institutions help strengthen incentives for innovative 
entrepreneurship in obtaining new productive knowledge, leading to greater economic 
complexity. Furthermore, well-functioning institutions foster human capital accumulation and 
deploy human resources in productive activities, thus augmenting economic complexity. 
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3. Data description and econometric specification 
3.1. The baseline model 
I explore the effects of institutions on economic complexity thorough estimating the following 
cross-country model: 𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
in which the outcome variable is the economic complexity index (ECI) . The main variable of 
interest is the quality of institutions captured by the Economic Freedom of the World Index 
(EFW). The coefficient on EFW reflects the contribution of institutional quality to economic 
complexity, and is expected to be positive (𝛽 > 0). The model specification is augmented with 
several geographic controls (𝑋), including mean levels of elevation, distance to the nearest 
waterways, a binary variable for landlocked countries, average land suitability for agriculture 
and the fraction of arable land. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 represents binary variables for Africa, America, 
Europe and Asia (Oceania is excluded as the base group). 𝜀 is the country-specific disturbance 
term. The benchmark model is estimated using a sample of up to 115 countries (𝑖 =1,2, … ,115), which is mainly dictated by the availability of data. The Supplementary 
Information contains a detailed description of all variables and data sources (see Appendix 
Tables A1 to A3 for more details). 
3.2. Economic complexity index 
The outcome variable is an index of economic complexity developed by Hidalgo and 
Hausmann (2009). This index provides an internationally comparable measure of cross-country 
differences in productive knowledge or capabilities, based on the types of products embedded 
in a country’s economic structures. The amount of productive capabilities is typically hard to 
measure in a consistent manner across the globe. This is because many non-tradeable 
capabilities are tacit and not codified (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). In order to resolve this 
issue, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) propose the method of reflections to indirectly capture 
the availability of productive capabilities within an economy. 
Accordingly, the types of products a country produces and exports with revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) arguably provide important insights into the set of productive 
knowledge. More specifically, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) create an index of economic 
complexity for each economy based on Diversity and Ubiquity metrics. Higher levels of 
Diversity correspond to the capacity to produce and export a diverse range of products, 
measured by the number of products a country exports with RCA (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 
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2009). Countries with highly diversified export structures may possess greater productive 
capabilities. Ubiquity is constructed by the number of countries exporting a given product with 
RCA (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). The production of sophisticated (high-productivity) 
products typically requires a wide range of hard-to-find capabilities. Hence, a country’s ability 
to produce and export less ubiquitous (less common) products indirectly reflects possession of 
greater productive knowledge. Taken altogether, complex economies, characterized by the 
ability to export a diverse range of sophisticated products, are those with high Diversity and 
low Ubiquity. By contrast, countries whose economic structures comprise of a limited range of 
ubiquitous products have low levels of economic complexity, which represents a lack of 
productive capabilities.5 Data, obtained from the Observatory for Economic Complexity, are 
averaged between 2000 and 2010 to estimate the benchmark model. Figure 2 depicts the 
variation in economic complexity across countries. 
3.3. The quality of institutions 
Conventional proxies for the cross-country variation in institutions include security of property 
rights, risk of expropriation, rule of law and constraints on the executive, among others. 
Plausible concerns about using such unidimensional measures of institutions relate to the 
possibility that they may not properly capture a wide range of institutional factors, including 
country-level tax, regulatory, and trade policies (Glaeser et al., 2004; Gwartney et al., 2006). 
Against this backdrop, I attempt to capture international differences in institutional quality by 
using EFW, provided by the Canadian Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. 
This indicator reflects the extent to which a country’s institutional environment provides 
support for the protection of property rights, voluntary exchange, personal choice and minimal 
regulation of markets (Gwartney et al., 2004). In particular, the construction of EFW exploits 
38 sub-indicators, measured on a categorical scale from zero to ten, with higher values 
corresponding to better-quality institutions. These components can be classified into five areas, 
including (1) size of government, (2) legal system and security of property rights, (3) freedom 
to trade internationally, (4) access to sound money, and (5) regulation of credit, labour and 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that ECI is constructed using data on cross-border movements of goods rather than services. 
Therefore, it may not properly derive productive capabilities from certain products that a country produces but 
does not export. Moreover, this indicator does not account for the sophistication level of service products. This 
may underestimate the amount of productive knowledge of several service-based economies, such as Australia 
(Hidalgo, 2021). Nevertheless, as highlighted by Hidalgo (2021), constructing an internationally comparable 
index of economic complexity based on trade in services appears to be very difficult due to the scarcity of data. 
A more detailed description of ECI is provided by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and Hidalgo (2021). 
10 
 
businesses. Therefore, EFW offers a comprehensive measure of numerous institutional factors, 
which helps capture the multidimensional facets of institutions (Gwartney et al., 2006). As put 
forward by Gwartney et al. (2006), countries with inclusive institutions would secure privately 
owned property, contract enforcement, and provide access to sound money. Moreover, the 
government’s minimal intervention into market entry, voluntary exchange and trade policies 
may foster an inclusive institutional environment, thus driving economic prosperity (Gwartney 
et al., 2006). The multidimensional nature of EFW helps address several concerns about using 
the aforementioned measures of institutions. In order to estimate the cross-sectional models, I 
also calculate a simple average of EFW across the period 2000 – 2010. Figure 3 depicts the 
variation in institutional quality across the world.  
3.4. Main control variables 
It is widely established in the long-term development literature that fundamental (fixed) 
geographic attributes exert a persistent influence on economic performance (Sachs, 2003; 
Carstensen & Gundlach, 2006). However, Rodrik et al. (2004) find suggestive evidence that 
country-level geographic characteristics transmit to underdevelopment in many societies 
across the world through shaping the persistence of poor-quality institutions. This lends support 
to the important role of deeply rooted institutions in affecting the worldwide distribution of 
income per capita. Nevertheless, geographic factors may simultaneously affect both institutions 
and economic complexity. In line with the existing literature, the main analysis is augmented 
with several geographic variables as control variables, including mean elevation, distance to 
the nearest waterways, a binary variable for being landlocked, mean land suitability for 
agriculture, and the fraction of arable land. This helps rule out the possibility that the long-term 
legacy of institutions for economic complexity is attributed to a country’s geographic 
endowments. Furthermore, continent dummies are incorporated in the benchmark model to 
account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across world regions. 
4. Identification strategy 
Empirical attempts at identifying a causal relationship between the quality of institutions and 
economic complexity face several challenges. A major concern relates to the possibility that 
the results can be driven by selection on unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
Additionally, reverse causation exists if higher levels of economic complexity foster 
institutional quality. The main variable of interest may also be subject to measurement errors, 
leading to biased and inconsistent estimates of the effects of institutions on ECI.  As discussed 
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below, there exists no perfect strategy of identification. Hence, I undertake a wide range of 
empirical analyses to alleviate these plausible concerns about causal inference.  
4.1. Assessing potential selection bias from unobservables 
Consistent with many studies in the long-term development literature, I estimate the baseline 
model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Consistent with the aforementioned arguments, 
the problem of omitted variables bias is partially addressed by allowing numerous geographic 
variables and continent dummies to enter the benchmark model specification. Nevertheless, 
countries differ significantly in numerous characteristics that may absorb the effects of 
institutional quality on ECI, making it difficult to identify and account for all relevant 
confounding factors. This provides a motivation for performing the coefficient stability test 
developed by Oster (2019). 
The method of Oster (2019) helps assess the scale of bias attributed to selection on 
unobserved confounders. More specifically, Oster (2019) proposes that selection bias from 
unobservables can be derived by comparing the estimated coefficients and R-squared values of 
a model with full observed controls, relative to that with a restricted set of observed controls. 
As argued by Oster (2019), this empirical approach offers important information on how large 
the amount of selection bias from unobservables needs to be, relative to the degree of bias 
attributed to observables, in order to completely absorb the estimated effects of EFW on ECI. 
The underlying idea builds upon an earlier contribution by Altonji et al. (2005) who posit that 
selection bias attributed to unobservables can be inferred from the reduction in selection bias 
when the standard regression models are augmented with observed controls. 
As articulated by Oster (2019), the data-generating process can be expressed in the 
following hypothetical model below:  𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 + 𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 represents the set of observed control variables, including country-level 
geographic characteristics and continent dummies. 𝑋𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑captures possibly unobserved 
confounders. Accordingly, the outcome variable is determined by both observables and 
unobservables. Assume that 𝑋𝑜 = 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 and 𝑋𝑢 = 𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑. The 𝛿 statistic of the 
proportional selection bias can be computed as: 
𝛿 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑜 , 𝐸𝐹𝑊)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑜) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑢, 𝐸𝐹𝑊)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑢)  
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The 𝛿 statistic captures how strong the correlation between institutions and unobservables, 
relative to observables, would need to be to attenuate the coefficient on EFW towards zero. 
Additionally, the bias-adjusted estimate of 𝛽 can be calculated assuming that unobserved 
confounders are as strongly correlated with EFW as observables (𝛿 = 1). 
𝛽∗ = 𝛽 − [?̈? − 𝛽] 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̃??̃? − ?̈?  
where 𝛽∗ captures the contribution of institutions to economic complexity when 𝛿 = 1. ?̈? and ?̈? denote, respectively, the coefficient and R-squared obtained from estimating models with a 
restricted set of observed controls. 𝛽 and ?̃? are, respectively, the coefficient and R-squared 
derived from estimating models with a full set of observed controls. 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the R-squared 
statistic of the aforementioned hypothetical model. Conventional wisdom is that the results are 
unlikely to be fully attributed to unobservables if the inclusion of observables does not alter 
the stability of the estimated coefficients. In addition, Oster (2019) accounts for the role of 
unobservables in explaining the variation in the dependent variable by comparing changes in 
R-squared values. To the extent that the R-squared statistic remains largely unchanged when 
incorporating observed controls, there exists a higher probability that unobserved confounders 
are correlated with the main variable of interest. Following Oster (2019), I calculate the 𝛿 and 𝛽∗ statistics to assess the relative importance of possible selection bias driven by 
unobservables. 
4.2. Isolating plausibly exogenous sources of variation in institutions 
Plausible concerns about reverse causation and measurement errors in the EFW remain intact 
even when I rule out possible selection bias from unobserved confounders. To circumvent these 
threats to causal inference, I rely on plausibly exogenous sources of variation in institutions to 
explain international differences in economic complexity. 
A commonly adopted approach to estimating the causal effects of institutions on 
development outcomes is based on the ‘germ’ theory of institutions proposed of Acemoglu et 
al. (2001). The basic idea is that European colonizers established different types of institutions 
in former colonies depending on the disease environment, leading to substantial and persistent 
variation in institutional quality across the globe.6 On this basis, Acemoglu et al. (2001) employ 
                                                          
6 Specifically, Europeans set up inclusive institutions in places where they could healthily settle (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). By contrast, where the disease environment was unfavourable for Europeans to settle permanently, they 
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the settler morality rate as an exogenous instrument for institutions to explain the worldwide 
distribution of income per capita. However, this influential contribution is not free from 
criticism. Glaeser et al. (2004) demonstrate that the global pattern of growth and development 
is mainly attributed to the human capital brought by European colonizers to their former 
colonies, rather than the quality of institutions per se. In response to the arguments articulated 
by Glaeser et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2014) document suggestive evidence of the primacy 
of institutions in shaping long-run development. In addition, Albouy (2012) questions the 
validity of the identification strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2001) because it exploits unreliable 
data on the settler mortality rate inferred from neighbouring countries. Regarding these 
concerns, Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide a detailed response arguing that the ‘germ’ theory of 
institutions remains highly predictive of cross-country differences in GDP per capita. 
Nevertheless, data on the settler mortality rate are available only for a restricted sample of 64 
former colonies, of which 53 countries are included in the main sample of this paper. A major 
disadvantage of the IV strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2001) lies in its limited coverage of world 
economies. The scarcity of the data makes it difficult to obtain a generalized understanding of 
the relationship between institutions and economic complexity across the world. 
Therefore, I employ two different instrumental variables to generate the plausibly 
exogenous component of institutions, and they differ substantially in terms of country 
coverage. First, motivated by Ang et al. (2018), this paper uses a measure of exposure to 
ultraviolet radiation (UV-R) as an instrument for EFW, which helps maximize the feasible 
sample size. This index, constructed by Andersen et al. (2016), captures the extent to which 
people living in a particular world region are exposed to the intensity of UV-R. The relevance 
of this instrument, which is a testable assumption, is supported by Ang et al. (2018) and Vu 
(2021a). Exploring the deep origins of institutions, Ang et al. (2018) document that exposure 
to UV-R is linked to the persistence of poor-quality institutions by shaping a disease 
environment that was unconducive for investment in institution building via cooperation. In a 
similar vein, Vu (2021a) find evidence that the intensity is associated with higher levels of 
corruption – a commonly adopted measure of poor governance/institutions.7 
The validity of this instrument requires that exposure to UV-R exerts no direct influence 
on economic complexity except through shaping the evolution of institutions. However, the 
                                                          
established extract institutions. The early colonial institutions persistent until today (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Therefore, colonial history provides an exogenous source of variation in institutions across countries. 
7 See Ang et al. (2018) and Vu (2021a) for more details. 
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exogeneity assumption cannot be verified empirically due to the unobserved nature of the 
disturbance terms. Admittedly, the intensity of UV-R may not transmit to long-term 
development exclusively by driving the worldwide distribution of institutions. As suggested by 
Andersen et al. (2016), exposure to UV-R may impart a persistent impact on economic 
complexity by affecting human capital accumulation. Andersen et al. (2016) document 
evidence of the reduced-form effects of UV-R on income levels. A possible mechanism 
underlying the reduced-form relationship between UV-R and income per capita is human 
capital accumulation. As put forward by Andersen et al. (2016), the permanent threat of 
contracting eye disease, caused by exposure to UV-R, reduces the length of work-life 
expectancy as a skilled worker, leading to persistent underdevelopment. Furthermore, the 
intensity of UV-R can be highly correlated with other geographic attributes, including absolute 
latitude or the fraction of the population at risk of contracting malaria, which can be relevant 
for long-term development. In this regard, isolating the exogenous component of institutions 
based on variation in UV-R intensity critically requires some attention to potential deviations 
from the exclusion restriction. Therefore, I follow the empirical procedure developed by 
Conley et al. (2012) to formally bound the estimated coefficient on EFW allowing for 
deviations from the orthogonality condition. As discussed in Section 5, the inclusion of several 
mechanisms that may invalidate the validity of the instrument may further address this concern.  
Second, I replicate the IV analysis using the settler mortality rate as an instrument with a 
highly restricted sample of 53 countries. The IV regression for this substantially reduced 
sample is also estimated using two different instruments to perform a test of over-identifying 
restrictions. This provides some support for the exogeneity requirements. If I obtain broadly 
similar estimates of the impacts of the exogenous component of institutions on economic 
complexity, the IV results for the reduced sample are unlikely to be exclusively driven by 
variation in the feasible sample size. Importantly, my findings plausibly carry a causal 
interpretation given that the IV strategy proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) has been heavily 
emulated in the long-term development literature. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Ordinary least squares estimates 
Figure 4 illustrates an unconditional correlation between institutional quality and economic 
complexity across countries. Consistent with the central hypothesis, there exists a positive 
association between institutions and economic complexity. However, these results may not 
necessarily carry a causal interpretation due to the aforementioned threats to identification. 
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To explore the contribution of institutions to economic complexity, I regress ECI on 
EFW, the main measure of institutional quality. Table 1 contains OLS estimates of the impacts 
of EFW on the worldwide distribution of productive capabilities. EFW enters the regression 
with a statistically significant and positive coefficient in all cases. The statistical significance 
of the estimated coefficients of EFW remains intact after accounting for several country-level 
geographic attributes and unobserved continent-specific factors. This provides evidence that 
the results are not driven by conventional explanations for long-term development across the 
world. In contrast to the main variable of interest, the coefficients on most geographic controls 
turn out to be imprecisely estimated at conventional thresholds of statistical significance. These 
findings are consistent with several studies documenting evidence of the primacy of 
institutions, rather than geography, in driving the global pattern of growth and development 
(Easterly & Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). Overall, the baseline OLS estimates reveal that 
countries endowed with inclusive institutions tend to accumulate greater productive 
capabilities, captured by higher levels of economic complexity. 
It is important to re-emphasize that the OLS estimates can be biased and inconsistent if 
relevant unobserved confounders are excluded from the model specification. For this reason, I 
report the 𝛿 and  𝛽∗ statistics derived from the coefficient stability test of Oster (2019) in Table 
1. Following Oster (2019), the construction of these statistics relies on an assumption that 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 
is 30% greater than ?̃? (see Section 4.1). Oster (2019) proposes that a value of the 𝛿 statistic 
exceeding one implies that selection on unobservables would need to be considerably stronger 
than selection on observables in order to explain away the main results. As demonstrated in 
column (2) of Table 1, the value of Oster’s 𝛿 statistic is 1.932. This reveals that the association 
between possibly unobserved confounders and institutions needs to be approximately twice as 
strong as that between observed control variables and institutions to attenuate the coefficient 
on EFW towards zero. Conditional on proportional selection (𝛿 = 1), the estimated coefficient 
on EFW, if I were to account for all unobserved confounders, would equal to 𝛽∗ = 0.110 
(Column 3, Table 1). This positive lower bound estimate captures the bias-adjusted effects of 
institutions on economic complexity. As demonstrated in Table 1, zero is safely excluded from 
the intervals bounded by the 𝛽∗ statistic and the baseline coefficient on EFW (𝛽). As put 
forward by Oster (2019), the results of the coefficient stability test indicate that the OLS 
estimates of the effects of institutions on economic complexity is unlikely to be explained away 
by potential selection bias from unobservables. This provides some support for causal inference 
although I cannot incorporate all possibly confounding factors in the regression. 
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5.2. Instrumental variables estimates 
Table 2 reports empirical estimates of the effects of the plausibly exogenous component of 
institutions, created by exposure to UV-R, on economic complexity. The first-stage results 
presented in Panel B of Table 2 reveal that the estimated coefficients of UV-R are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases. These results are consistent with recent 
studies documenting the negative effects of UV-R on the quality of institutions (Ang et al., 
2018; Vu, 2021a). Furthermore, the F-statistic of excluded instrument developed by Olea and 
Pflueger (2013) is much larger than the rule-of-thumb value of 10 in all cases (Table 2). This 
helps rule out concerns about using an instrument that is weakly correlated with the potential 
endogenous regressor. The F-statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013) offers reliable inference on 
weak instruments even when using clustered, autocorrelated and non-homoscedastic data 
(Andrews et al., 2019). Following Andrews et al. (2019), I also report identification-robust 
Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals in Table 2. Given that none of these bound estimates 
contains zero, the effects of the exogenous component of EFW on ECI retain their statistical 
precision regardless of the strength of the instrument in the first-stage regression (Andrews et 
al., 2019). Overall, the first-stage estimates and several diagnostic tests lend support to the 
relevance of the instrument for institutions (Table 2). 
Turning to the second-stage results reported in Panel A of Table 2, the estimated 
coefficients of EFW have a positive sign in all cases, indicating that institutions exert a positive 
influence on economic complexity. The estimated effects are also precise at the 1% level of 
statistical significance. Moreover, the sign and statistical precision of the coefficients on EFW 
withstand the inclusion of the geographic control variables and continent dummies. As 
demonstrated in Table 2, I also find evidence that institutions play a more important role in 
shaping long-run economic performance compared with geographic endowments. Consistent 
with the benchmark OLS estimates, the IV findings imply that countries with better 
institutional quality are likely to enjoy higher levels of economic complexity. On this basis, 
establishing an inclusive institutional environment is conductive to the ability to produce and 
export a wide range of sophisticated products, possibly sustaining long-term economic 
development. As discussed above, the positive relationship between institutions and economic 
complexity draws upon the premise that good institutions act as a catalyst for innovative 
entrepreneurship in the ‘cost-discovery’ process, resulting in higher levels of economic 
complexity (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). 
It is also widely established that market-supporting institutions guarantee greater payoffs to 
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human capital accumulation, and foster an optimal allocation of human resources between 
productive and non-productive activities (Natkhov & Polishchuk, 2019). This contributes to 
growing economic complexity via increasing the quality of human capital and directing human 
resources towards acquiring productive capabilities. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients of EFW reveals that institutions exert 
sizeable effects on ECI. For example, the EFW index values of Thailand and Japan are 6.71 
and 7.72, respectively. The difference in institutional quality between these two countries 
equals 1.01, which is approximately one standard deviation of the EFW index in the sample. 
According to the estimated coefficients in column (3) of Table 2, a one-unit increase in the 
plausibly exogenous component of institutions, generated by UV-R, implies a 1.146-unit 
increase in ECI. Thus, if Thailand instead experienced a level of the EFW index similar to 
Japan, the expected increase in the ECI of Thailand would be 1.157 units, which is 
approximately 2.5 times its initial ECI value (0.482), a substantial increase. Overall, this paper 
documents evidence of the economic and statistical significance of the long-term legacy of 
institutions for international variation in economic complexity. 
Furthermore, I adopt alternative instrument sets, and report the empirical results in Table 
3. As illustrated in the first column of Table 3, I employ the log of settler mortality rate to 
generate an exogenous source of variation in institutions across 53 European former colonies. 
In column (2) of Table 3, I regress ECI on the exogenous component of EFW created by 
exposure to UV-R using a comparable sample of former colonies. In the last column of Table 
3, both instruments are exploited to generate the plausibly exogenous variation in institutions. 
The first-stage estimates presented in Panel B of Table 3 are consistent with the ‘germ’ theory 
of institutions of Acemoglu et al. (2001). The coefficient on EFW reported in Panel A of Table 
3 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The statistical significance and sign of 
the effects of institutions on economic complexity remain insensitive to using different 
instrument sets and a highly restricted sample of countries. The p-value obtained from a test of 
over-identifying restrictions provides some additional support for the plausibility of my IV 
approach. 
Using alternative methods of identification, I consistently obtain precise estimates of the 
long-term effects of deeply rooted institutions on economic complexity. This is in line with the 
central hypothesis that establishing inclusive institutions contributes to structural 
transformation towards productive activities that can help sustain future prosperity. 
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5.3. Using alternative measures of institutions 
As argued earlier, EFW is adopted as a comprehensive (multidimensional) measure of 
institutional quality and policies, following Gwartney et al. (2006). One may well argue that 
this measure of institutions fails to capture other aspects of a country’s institutional 
environment, such as control of corruption or the quality of legal systems. It is noteworthy that 
the quality of institutions encompasses different aspects, making it difficult to obtain an 
internationally comparable proxy for this multidimensional concept. 
To alleviate the above concern, I replicate the baseline analysis using alternative 
measures of institutions. To this end, I use various sub-indicators of the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators to capture the cross-country variation in institutional quality. Higher 
values of these variables represent better institutions. I reproduce both the OLS and IV 
regressions, as reported in Table 4. As shown in column (1) of Table 4, the quality of 
institutions is measured by the rule of law index, which reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. I also adopt a measure of 
control of corruption that is based on perceptions of the degree to which public power is 
misappropriated for private gain (Column 2, Table 4). Moreover, institutions, reflected in the 
quality of public services, policies, and its independence from political pressure, are measured 
by an index of government effectiveness (Column 3, Table 4). In the last column of Table 4, 
institutional quality is proxied by the voice & accountability index, which reflects perceptions 
on freedom to select the government, and freedom of media, association, and expression. The 
results presented in Table 4 indicate that alternative measures of institutions still impart a 
statistically significant and positive influence on economic complexity. Hence, it is plausible 
that the established relationship between institutions and economic complexity is not 
exclusively attributed to using EFW as a proxy for the main variable of interest.     
5.4. Potential violation of the exclusion restriction 
Obtaining consistent inference of the IV estimates presented in Table 2 critically requires 
justification of the validity of the exclusion restriction. The aforementioned argument suggests 
that the orthogonality requirement can be violated if exposure to UV-R transmits to economic 
complexity through shaping the quality of human capital. Therefore, this mechanism of 
transmission appears to be a key threat to my identification strategy. To circumvent this 
concern, I rely on the approach developed by Conley et al. (2012) to investigate whether the 
main IV estimates are robust to allowing for potential deviations from the exogeneity condition. 
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Assuming that exposure to UV-R may have a direct influence on the outcome variable, 
the benchmark model can be re-written as: 𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑉 − 𝑅)𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, in which the log of UV-R is used to isolate the plausibly exogenous 
component of institutions in the main IV analysis. The exogeneity requirement is satisfied 
when 𝛾 = 0, but this assumption is largely untestable. Given challenges with justification of 
the exclusion restriction, Conley et al. (2012) develop an intuitive approach that provides 
reliable inference even when the exogeneity condition is slightly violated (𝛾 ≠ 0). The 
underlying idea is that it would be possible to estimate the above model using exposure to UV-
R as an IV for institutions if one were to calculate the true value of 𝛾. As such, the IV regression 
could be performed by first removing 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑉 − 𝑅)𝑖 from both sides of the model. However, 
the magnitude of the direct influence of UV-R on economic complexity is unknown. Therefore, 
the methodology developed by Conley et al. (2012) relies on an assumption about the size of 𝛾, which follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 𝛿2 (𝛾 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝛿2)).The IV 
regression can be estimated by varying the values of the standard deviation 𝛿. On this basis, it 
is possible to construct 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient on EFW (𝛽). 
Table 5 reports the 95% confidence intervals of 𝛽 allowing for possible deviations from 
the orthogonality condition, based on making different assumptions about the magnitude of the 
effects of UV-R on ECI. More specifically, the size of 𝛾 is assumed to equate up to 20% – 
100% of the marginal impact of institutions on economic complexity derived from the 
benchmark IV regression (see Column 3, Table 2). Table 5 should be read as the partial effects 
of institutions on economic complexity when I assume, for example, that the direct influence 
of the instrument on ECI corresponds to 20% of the size of the effects of institution on ECI in 
the main IV estimates (2𝛿 = 20%). For the purpose of comparison, I also replicate this empirical 
exercise using alternative measures of institutions, discussed in Section 5.3. The bounds of 𝛽 
do not encompass zero in most specifications. Even when making an implausibly strong 
assumption about possible violation of the exclusion restriction (CI 2𝛿 = 100%), the main 
findings retain their statistical significance, except in columns (1) and (5) of Table 5. This 
implies that the effects of institutions on economic complexity remain precisely estimated at 
the 5% level of statistical significance even if I allow for possible deviations from the 
exogeneity condition. Moreover, the findings retain their statistical significance, except in 
columns (1) and (5). Admittedly, I may not completely rule out plausible concerns about the 
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reliability of the exclusion restriction. Nevertheless, this widely used approach helps provide 
some further evidence of the plausibility of my identification approach.8 
5.5.   Sensitivity analyses 
This sub-section contains the results of numerous robustness checks. In particular, I replicate 
both the main OLS and IV regressions by controlling for alternative explanations for cross-
country differences in economic complexity. The benchmark findings also withstand 
accounting for unobserved time-invariant factors by estimating dynamic panel data models, 
notwithstanding several caveats below. I also rule out the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between institutions and economic complexity, and investigate the effects of 
potential outliers. The detailed results are presented in the Supplementary Information.  
Robustness to accounting for early development 
A conventional explanation for comparative cross-country development highlights the 
persistent influence of early development and/or historically determined variables. For 
example, accumulated experience with state-like polities spanning thousands of years plays a 
key role in shaping global differences in income per capita (Bockstette et al., 2002; Borcan et 
al., 2018), institutions (Ang, 2013), and income inequality (Vu, 2021c). It is also widely 
acknowledged that civil-law countries, compared with their common-law counterparts, are 
more (financially) underdeveloped (La Porta et al., 2008), and tend to suffer from the 
persistence of poor governance (La Porta et al., 1999). Moreover, several scholars posit that 
having experienced an early transition to sedentary agriculture, dating back to 10,000 years 
ago, is conducive to contemporary economic development (Hibbs & Olsson, 2004; Ang, 2013). 
An influential contribution to this line of inquiry by Ashraf and Galor (2013) suggests that the 
current level of genetic diversity, as determined over the prehistoric course of the exodus of 
Homo sapiens from East Africa tens of thousands of years ago, imparts an inverted U-shaped 
effect on income per capita.9 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) contend that cultural barriers to 
                                                          
8 A recent study by Casey and Klemp (2021) revisits the validity of historical instruments, commonly adopted in 
the long-run development literature. It empirically establishes that using historical or slowly evolving variables to 
create plausibly exogenous sources of variation in contemporary variables, including institutions, may provide 
inconsistent estimates due to potential deviations from the exclusion restriction. Based on replicating influential 
studies examining the deep origins of long-term economic performance, Casey and Klemp (2021) highlights the 
relevance of applying the framework of Conley et al. (2012) to formally bound the main coefficient of interest. 
9 According to Ashraf and Galor (2013), genetic diversity corresponds to the likelihood that two people randomly 
selected from a relevant population are genetically dissimilar to each other, with regard to a given spectrum of 
genetic traits. The degree of genetic heterogeneity within a country is negatively linked to migratory distance to 
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the world frontiers of technologies, captured by an index of genetic relatedness between 
populations, hinder economic performance by imposing greater costs on the cross-border 
diffusion of technological innovation. To the extent that these factors simultaneously affect 
both institutions and economic complexity, my findings could be biased and inconsistent. 
However, the inclusion of possible historical confounders in the benchmark model fails to alter 
the results (Appendix Table A4). 
Robustness to incorporating the ‘proximate’ determinants of economic complexity 
An additional concern is that the established relationship between institutions and 
economic complexity is driven by failure to account for the ‘proximate’ determinants of 
productive capabilities. Indeed, previous studies have predominantly exploited several 
macroeconomic variables to explain why countries differ in the types of products embedded in 
their economic structures. These factors include trade openness, financial development and the 
size of government (Hausmann et al., 2007; Zhu & Fu, 2013; Sweet & Maggio, 2015). The 
aforementioned argument suggests that these variables are jointly determined along with ECI, 
which necessitates investigating the fundamental drivers of complexity. Moreover, obtaining a 
valid basis for statistical inference on the contribution of these variables to economic 
complexity requires addressing endogeneity concerns. However, empirical attempts at 
isolating plausibly exogenous causes of numerous endogenous regressors appear to be 
challenging. If institutions affect economic complexity through these ‘proximate’ factors, 
incorporating them in the baseline model may capture part of the relationship between deeply 
rooted institutions and today’s productive capabilities. However, my findings withstand 
augmenting the main analysis with several ‘proximate’ causes of economic complexity even 
though I cannot rule out plausible endogeneity concerns relating to these ‘proximate’ 
determinants (Appendix Table A5). 
Robustness to controlling for other effects 
To attenuate omitted variables bias, I allow additional variables to enter the baseline 
model specification. Specifically, I control for other geographic covariates, including mean 
precipitation and the fraction of the population at risk of contracting malaria. It is also well 
established that population diversity may affect long-term development through shaping the 
quality of institutions or productivity (La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003). Hence, I 
                                                          
East Africa. A medium length of genetic diversity is conductive to economic prosperity. In contrast, 
underdevelopment tends to persist in highly diverse and homogenous societies. 
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attempt to address this problem by augmenting the main analysis with an index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003). Another concern 
relates to the likelihood that the benchmark findings are purely driven by cross-country 
differences in natural resource endowments (Acemoglu et al., 2001). This motivates controlling 
for the legacy of natural resources for long-run economic development, following Acemoglu 
et al. (2001). As represented in Appendix Table A6, incorporating these additional controls in 
the regression fails to explain away the observed relationship between institutions and 
economic complexity. 
Robustness to estimating dynamic panel data models 
The system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator of Blundell and Bond 
(1998) has been popularly adopted to address endogeneity concerns in the growth-development 
literature (see, e.g., Bazzi & Clemens, 2013; Kraay, 2016). The system GMM estimator, in 
particular, exploits lagged levels and lagged differences of the potentially endogenous 
regressors as internal instruments for the contemporaneous model specification in differences 
and levels, respectively. A key advantage of estimating dynamic panel data models lies in the 
ability to account for unobserved time-invariant factors, which possibly bias empirical 
estimates derived from a cross-sectional framework. One could argue that the main findings of 
this paper are confounded by unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across nations. This 
paper demonstrates, by estimating dynamic panel data models using the system GMM 
estimator, that this argument is largely implausible. The results reported in Appendix Table A7 
indicate that institutions exert positive and statistically significant effects on economic 
complexity when holding unobserved country-specific factors constant. The system GMM 
estimates, largely driven by the within-country variation in the data, are suggestive of a 
substantial reduction in the magnitude of the effects of institutions on complexity, relative to 
the cross-sectional estimates. However, the main interest of this paper lies in understanding the 
long-term legacy of institutions for persistent and substantial differences in economic 
complexity across the world. To this end, the benchmark model specification is more relevant. 
Importantly, violations of the exogeneity condition, as rigorously explored throughout 
this research, are more likely to arise using internal instruments. This concern primarily stems 
from the persistent nature of the worldwide distribution of institutions, growth and 
development (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Against the background of the persistence of 
(under)development, the moment conditions within a system GMM framework are invalidated, 
which undermines consistent inference. As argued by Bazzi and Clemens (2013), this problem 
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is regularly ignored in many empirical studies using the system GMM estimator to explore the 
driving forces of growth and development across countries. In a broadly similar context, Carter 
et al. (2021), through undertaking a wide range of simulations, reveal that the slowly evolving 
feature of endogenous variables invalidates statistical inference based on the use of internal 
instruments. Moreover, the issue of weak instrument bias tends to proliferate in system GMM, 
but it has received little attention in the empirical growth literature (Bazzi & Clemens, 2013; 
Kraay, 2016). Indeed, the first-stage estimates are commonly hidden, and identification-robust 
confidence bounds remain hard to find in studies applying the system GMM estimator (Bazzi 
& Clemens, 2013; Kraay, 2016; Andrews et al., 2019). These concerns have been thoroughly 
explored through a series of empirical analyses on the validity of the exclusion restriction and 
the strength of the instrument. Hence, I maintain using the benchmark estimates to draw 
consistent inference on the contribution of institutions to economic complexity.  
Additional robustness checks 
I explore the presence of a non-linear relationship between institutions and economic 
complexity. To this end, I rely on Ramsey’s RESET test of functional form misspecification to 
test whether the baseline model is appropriately specified. Appendix Table A8 contains the 
results, which provide evidence against functional form misspecification. Moreover, I 
undertake a non-parametric estimation based on kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. 
Accordingly, there exists no evidence of a non-linear correlation between institutions and 
complexity, except for a few outliers at the upper and lower bounds of EFW (Appendix Figure 
A1). Even when the model specification is augmented with a quadratic term of EFW, the results 
are not supportive of a higher-order relationship (Appendix Table A9). Additionally, the 
presence of possible outliers could account for the established association between institutions 
and economic complexity. To address this issue, I replicate the main analysis by excluding 
potential outliers, identified by estimating Cook’s distance, standardized residuals, and robust 
regression weights. The results provided in Appendix Table A10 indicate that the benchmark 
findings are not sensitive to removing outliers.  
6. Extensions 
6.1. Institutions, human capital, and economic complexity 
A high-profile contribution to the long-term development literature by Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
emphasizes the role of institutions, rather than other ‘proximate’ determinants of growth, 
including human capital. Their main argument is that substantial variation in contemporary 
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institutions across countries has its deep historical roots from the patterns of European 
colonization, as reviewed previously (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Nonetheless, Glaeser et al. 
(2004) challenge this viewpoint by documenting that human capital accumulation plays a more 
critical role than institutions in shaping the worldwide distribution of income per head. Glaeser 
et al. (2004) empirically establish that the persistence of underdevelopment is attributed to the 
human capital, rather than the types of institutions, brought by European colonizers to their 
former colonies. A detailed response to this critique is provided by Acemoglu et al. (2014). 
Against this background, the relative importance of institutions and human capital in driving 
long-run growth and development remains controversial. 
The central hypothesis of this paper rests upon the premise that institutions transmit to 
growing economic complexity partially through fostering the quality of human capital. My 
understanding is that human capital is interrelated with and reinforced by a country’s 
productive capabilities, thus offering an inadequate explanation as a fundamental driver of 
economic complexity. By contrast, deeply rooted institutions arguably provide a deeper 
understanding of the evolution of economic complexity. On this basis, I propose that human 
capital is a mechanism underlying the relationship between institutions and complexity. 
Motivated by Glaeser et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2014), I further examine the primacy 
of institutions versus human capital in driving international differences in complexity. To this 
end, the benchmark model specification is augmented with the World Bank’s index of human 
capital (Kraay, 2019). Moreover, this empirical exercise is a conventional approach to 
addressing concerns about the plausibility of the exclusion restriction, discussed in Section 5.4. 
By doing that, I attempt to isolate the effects of the exogenous component of institutions, 
created by exposure to UV-R, on ECI from the impact of human capital. The validity of this 
empirical approach critically requires attention to the endogenous nature of both institutions 
and human capital. Given the arguments of Glaeser et al. (2004), I employ the intensity of UV-
R and the settler morality rate as instruments for both institutions and human capital 
accumulation.10 Using a broadly similar method of identification, my results are directly 
comparable to those provided by Glaeser et al. (2004). 
Table 6 reports the IV estimates of the effects of institutions and human capital on 
economic complexity. In line with the main findings, institutions enter the regression with a 
                                                          
10
 Acemoglu et al. (2014) propose using the number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in the 1920s as 
an exogenous instrument for the quality of human capital. Unfortunately, this potential instrument is available for 
only 40 countries included in this paper, thus constraining the feasible sample size significantly. Hence, I use the 
settler mortality rate as an instrument for human capital to re-examine the argument of Glaeser et al. (2004). 
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positive coefficient. The estimated contribution of institutions to economic complexity remains 
statistically significant at the 10% level once partialling out the influence of human capital. By 
contrast, human capital has no statistically significant influence on a country’s productive 
capabilities. These results are consistent with the argument that institutions are the deep 
determinants of economic complexity, which lends support to the findings of Acemoglu et al. 
(2014). A misinterpretation of the results in Table 6 is that the quality of human capital does 
not matter for accumulating greater productive knowledge. Instead, the results are consistent 
with the central hypothesis that human capital accumulation is an important mechanism 
underlying the relationship between institutions and complexity. This helps disentangle the 
roles of institutions versus human capital in shaping long-term development. Interestingly, 
using a more comprehensive measure of institutional quality, I find that the settler mortality 
rate is more highly correlated with institutions, rather than human capital (Columns 2 and 3, 
Table 6). This is in stark contrast to the results of Glaeser et al. (2004). Importantly, the IV 
estimates in Table 6 further attenuate concerns about the plausibility of the main IV results by 
controlling for a potential mechanism that may invalidate the exclusion restriction. 
6.2. Mechanisms underlying the effects of institutions on economic complexity 
As articulated in Section 2, institutions exert a positive influence on economic complexity via 
boosting incentives for innovative entrepreneurship, improving the quality of human capital, 
and increasing deployment of human resources in productive activities. Exploring the relative 
importance of institutions versus human capital in driving the cross-country variation in 
economic complexity, I provide suggestive evidence for one of these proposed mechanisms. 
Specifically, a conventional approach to establishing the underlying channels of influence is to 
augment the regression model with proposed mediating variables. However, this widely 
adopted method yields inconsistent estimates due to intermediate variables bias (Acharya et 
al., 2016).11 To provide a more valid basis for statistical inference, I undertake a mediation 
analysis for different proposed mechanisms underlying the relationship between institutions 
and complexity, based on the methodology developed by Acharya et al. (2016). 
In order to perform the empirical strategy of Acharya et al. (2016), I capture cross-
country differences in key pathways through which institutions translate into higher degrees of 
                                                          
11 As highlighted by an Associate Editor, the results would not imply causal inference if I were to incorporated 
potentially mediating channels in the regression without addressing endogeneity concerns of these variables. It is 
noteworthy that isolating plausibly exogenous sources of variation of different mechanisms depicted in Figure 1 
is challenging.  
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economic complexity. For this purpose, I employ two sub-indicators of the global innovation 
index as proxies for innovative entrepreneurship, including knowledge and technology outputs, 
and creative outputs (Dutta et al., 2020). The dataset provided by Dutta et al. (2020) offers 
comprehensive measures of international variation in innovative entrepreneurship undertaken 
by scientists, manufacturing and service firms, and public entities, among others. The data also 
have a wide coverage of up to 131 world economies. To be more specific, I use an index of 
knowledge and technology outputs, which reflects knowledge creation, knowledge impact and 
knowledge diffusion (Dutta et al., 2020).12 I also employ a measure of creative outputs to 
measure the creation of intangible assets and creative goods and services (Dutta et al., 2020).  
In line with the analysis in Section 6.1, I use the World Bank’s human capital index to 
capture investments in human capital (Kraay, 2019). It reflects the expected level of human 
capital that a child born today may obtain by the age of 18, given the threats to health and 
education improvements prevailing within a society (Kraay, 2019). Following Murphy et al. 
(1991) and Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019), I attempt to capture the deployment of human 
resources in productive activities, rather than non-productive activities, by using the share of 
tertiary education graduates in sciences. This measure of the allocation of talent, compiled by 
the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, encompasses the fraction of graduates majoring in life and 
physical sciences, mathematics, technology and engineering. 
Overall, this section is devoted to understanding the roles of (1) knowledge and 
technology outputs, (2) creative outputs, (3) human capital accumulation and (4) the allocation 
of talent in mediating the established effects of institutions on economic complexity (Figure 
1). Before discussing the mediation method developed by Acharya et al. (2016), I replicate the 
main analysis by using the aforementioned mediating factors as alternative outcome variables. 
Consistent with numerous studies cited in Section 2, I find evidence that institutions have 
positive impacts on innovative entrepreneurship, human capital accumulation and the 
allocation of talent towards productive activities (Figure 1).13 Moreover, previous studies also 
suggest that these proposed pathways play a key role in shaping the worldwide distribution of 
economic complexity (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2007; Costinot, 2009; Zhu 
                                                          
12 According to Dutta et al. (2020), knowledge creation is measured by registered patents, utility model 
applications, peer-reviewed articles, while knowledge impact is captured by, for example, improvements in labour 
productivity, entry density of new firms, and firms’ utilization of science and technologies. Moreover, knowledge 
diffusion is reflected in the international exchange of intellectual properties, ICT services, and high-tech products, 
among others (Dutta et al., 2020). These factors capture a country’s efforts to acquire productive knowledge. See 
also Dutta et al. (2020) for a more detailed description. 
13 These estimates are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
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& Fu, 2013; Zhu & Li, 2017; Lapatinas & Litina, 2019). Therefore, the mediating variables 
plausibly play an important role in explaining the contribution of institutions to economic 
complexity. 
In order to investigate the size of the total effects of institutions on economic complexity 
attributed to these mechanisms, I rely on a simple two-stage regression procedure of Acharya 
et al. (2016). The first step involves regressing ECI on the treatment variable (EFW) and the 
mediators (e.g., human capital), controlling for the main geographic attributes and continent 
dummies. Using these empirical estimates, I construct a demediated outcome variable by 
subtracting the effects of the mediators from the fitted values of ECI. In the second-step 
regression, the average controlled direct effects (ACDE) of institutions on economic 
complexity are estimated by regressing the demediated dependent variable on EFW, 
geographic controls and continent dummies.14 According to Acharya et al. (2016), the unbiased 
ACDE estimates offer valid inference on the impacts of institutions on economic complexity 
holding the effects of the mediating variables fixed at a particular level. Meanwhile, the 
baseline results reflect the total effects of institutions on ECI when I do not account for the 
underlying mechanisms. The difference between the ACDE estimates and the benchmark 
findings in terms of their statistical precision and magnitude captures the role of the mediating 
variables in explaining the established relationship between institutions and economic 
complexity (Acharya et al., 2016). 
Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the ACDE 
estimates of EFW on ECI when partialling out the effects of the proposed mechanisms. More 
specifically, the results capture the ACDE estimates of institutions on economic complexity 
once I account for (1) knowledge and technology outputs (ACDE (Know_tech outputs)), (2) 
creative outputs (ACDE (Creative outputs)), (3) human capital accumulation (ACDE (Human 
capital)), and (4) the deployment of human resources in productive activities (ACDE 
(Allocation of talent)). Furthermore, I undertake an additional mediation analysis by accounting 
                                                          
14 More specifically, the first-step regression model can be expressed as 𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝜑𝑀𝑖 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, in which 𝑀𝑖 stands for possible mediating variables (see also the benchmark model for a 
description of other variables). Next, the demediated outcome variable is calculated as 𝐸𝐶𝐼?̃? = 𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 − ?̂?𝑀𝑖. The 
second-stage regression is represented by 𝐸𝐶𝐼?̃? =  𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖. The estimated 
coefficient on EFW (𝛽2̂) reflects the estimated effects of institutions on economic complexity accounting for 
potentially mediating variables. However, Acharya et al. (2016) emphasize that the standard errors obtained from 
the second-stage regression can be biased given that the first-stage estimates of ?̂? are not accounted for. To address 




for all mediating variables (ACDE (All mechanisms)). In all cases, the model specification is 
augmented with the set of main geographic controls and continent dummies, and the 
bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications are adopted to obtain reliable 
inference. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the magnitude of the ACDE of institutions on ECI, except for 
ACDE (Creative outputs), is significantly smaller than that of the total effects, reported in 
Column (3) of Tables 1 and 2. The results depicted in Panel A of Figure 5 suggest that the OLS 
estimates of the ACDE of institutions remain precisely estimated at conventionally accepted 
levels of statistical significance, except for ACDE (Know_tech outputs) and ACDE (All 
mechanisms). However, the ACDE estimates of the plausibly exogenous component of 
institutions turn out to be highly imprecisely estimates at commonly accepted thresholds of 
significance (Panel B, Figure 5). Moreover, there exists substantial reduction in the statistical 
precision and magnitude of the effects of institutions on ECI when accounting for all possibly 
mediating variables (see ACDE (All mechanisms)). 
The findings indicate that institutions have no statistical significant effect on economic 
complexity when partialling out the effects of mediating factors. In other words, the established 
positive association between institutions and complexity is mainly mediated by innovative 
entrepreneurship, human capital accumulation and the deployment of human resources in 
productive activities. This is consistent with the arguments outlined in Section 2 and Figure 1. 
Overall, these estimates suggest that the proposed mechanisms play a key role in shaping the 
extent to which institutions translate into cross-country differences in economic complexity. 
7. Concluding remarks 
This study empirically establishes that institutions are the fundamental drivers of economic 
complexity – a measure of the amount of productive capabilities. The basic intuition is that 
complex economies producing and exporting a diverse range of sophisticated (high-
productivity) products tend to accumulate greater productive knowledge. In contrast, countries 
characterized by specialization in a limited range of simple (low-productivity) products are 
likely to suffer from lack of productive capabilities, thus impeding long-run economic growth 
driven by structural transformation. On this basis, economic complexity is highly predictive of 
future growth and development. A key distinguishing feature of this paper is to demonstrate 
that the availability of productive capabilities, captured by higher economic complexity, tends 
to proliferate in countries with well-functioning institutions. 
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The main hypothesis of this paper draws upon the ‘self-discovery’ theory of Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et al. (2007). Accordingly, the extent of productive 
capabilities within a country critically depends on the number of entrepreneurs who pioneer in 
discovering the underlying cost structure of an economy. This process creates positive 
externalities by providing important information on the types of (new) products that can be 
profitably produced domestically. I propose that well-functioning institutions, by reducing cost 
uncertainties associated with the ‘self-discovery’ process, contribute to a higher degree of 
economic complexity. In other words, inclusive institutions, including security of property 
rights and enforcement of laws, contracts and regulations, reward productive activities, thus 
directing innovative entrepreneurship in the ‘self-discovery’ process. By contrast, countries 
with weak institutions may fail to internalize the externalities of cost discoveries, thereby 
reducing economic complexity. Furthermore, the quality of institutions is linked to growing 
economic complexity through enhancing human capital accumulation and deploying human 
resources in productive activities (Figure 1). 
Based on a series of empirical analyses, this paper consistently documents evidence 
supporting the hypothesized positive relationship between institutional quality and economic 
complexity. Specifically, the OLS estimates are suggestive of the important role of institutions 
in shaping the variation in complexity across the world. To alleviate plausible concerns about 
omitted variables bias, I assess the scale of bias from selection on unobservables using the 
coefficient stability test of Oster (2019). The results indicate that the contribution of institutions 
to productive capabilities is not easily explained away by possibly unobserved confounders. 
Moreover, the plausibly exogenous component of institutions, generated by exposure to UV-R 
and the settlers’ mortality rate, has a positive impact on the accumulation of productive 
knowledge. I also rely on the ‘plausibly exogenous’ instruments framework of Conley et al. 
(2012) to formally bound the estimates of institutions permitting possible deviations from the 
exclusion restriction. The bound estimates, together with a thorough analysis of weak 
instrument bias, demonstrate that my IV findings can provide a causal interpretation. 
This paper also attempts to resolve inconclusive findings on the relative importance of 
institutions versus human capital in driving long-term development (Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Acemoglu et al., 2014). In line with Acemoglu et al. (2014), I find suggestive evidence of the 
primacy of institutions in shaping the global pattern of economic complexity. This stands in 
contrast to the findings of Glaeser et al. (2004). As argued above, human capital accumulation 
is a ‘proximate’ driver of economic complexity, whereas slowly evolving institutions provide 
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a more fundamental explanation for the deep causes of productive capabilities. Hence, deeply 
rooted institutions may translate into economic complexity through strengthening incentives 
for accumulating knowledge and education. A final empirical analysis is to estimate the extent 
of the long-term legacy of institutions for economic complexity attributed to several mediating 
variables, depicted in Figure 1. The mediation results support the main hypothesis that strong 
institutions affect economic complexity primarily through promoting innovative 
entrepreneurship, human capital accumulation, and the allocation of human resources towards 
productive activities. 
It is worth re-emphasizing that structural transformation towards producing and 
exporting a diverse range of sophisticated products plays a key role in fostering future 
economic prosperity (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo & 
Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014). The miracle growths of several East Asian 
economies, driven by technological innovation and imitation, are suggestive of the importance 
of acquiring productive capabilities in sustaining long-run growth (Liang, 2010; Ang & 
Madsen, 2011). Nevertheless, many less-developed economies, characterized by the 
persistence of poor-quality institutions, find it hard to transform themselves from 
technologically backward to technologically advanced economies. Therefore, the main 
findings of this paper help generate a policy prescription by demonstrating that institutions 
foster structural change of a country’s economic structures. In other words, persistent weak 
institutions appears to be a major impediment to acquiring productive capabilities, which are 
highly predictive of future development. This advocates for establishing inclusive institutions 
in order to strengthen economic complexity and long-term development. Policymakers should 
recognize the contribution of institutional improvements to structural transformation, 
particularly in developing economies where considerable resistance to building pro-
development economic and political institutions typically persists. 
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Figure 1. Potential mechanisms underlying the main hypothesis 
Notes: This figure depicts possible mechanisms through which institutions affect economic complexity. 
Section 2 contains a more detailed discussion of the proposed pathways. Section 6 presents empirical 













Figure 2. The worldwide distribution of economic complexity 
Notes: This figure depicts international differences in economic complexity, a measure of productive 
capabilities. Darker areas correspond to more complex economies characterized by the ability to 
produce (and export) a diverse range of sophisticated (high-productivity) products. Data, obtained from 
the Observatory of Economic Complexity, are averaged across the period 2000 – 2010.  
 
Figure 3. The worldwide distribution of institutional quality 
Notes: This figure depicts international differences in the quality of institutions, captured by the 
Economic Freedom of the World Index. Darker areas correspond to societies with better institutional 
quality. Data, obtained from the Canadian Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation, are averaged 





Figure 4. The relationship between institutional quality and economic complexity 
Notes: This figure depicts an unconditional correlation between the quality of institutions and economic 
complexity across the world. Countries’ abbreviations are obtained from the World Bank’s World 






Figure 5. Average controlled direct effects of institutions on economic complexity 
Notes: This figure depicts the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the average controlled 
direct effects of institutions on economic complexity. The results capture the contribution of institutions 
to economic complexity accounting for the impacts of potentially mediating variables, including 
innovative entrepreneurship (Know_tech outputs & Creative outputs), human capital accumulation 




Table 1. The effects of institutional quality on economic complexity, OLS estimates 
Dep_var: ECI (1) (2) (3) 
EFW 0.673*** 0.669*** 0.449*** 
 (0.081) (0.095) (0.101) 
Mean elevation  -0.146 -0.092 
  (0.199) (0.186) 
Distance to the nearest waterways  -0.174 -0.181 
  (0.241) (0.142) 
Landlocked dummy  0.074 -0.007 
  (0.251) (0.213) 
Land suitability for agriculture  -0.129 -0.149 
  (0.325) (0.390) 
The fraction of arable land  0.014** -0.003 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Continent dummies No No Yes  
Observations (# of countries) 115 100 100 
R-squared 0.419 0.510 0.657 
Oster’s 𝛿 statistic for 𝛽 = 0  1.932 1.184 
Oster’s lower bound estimates (𝛽∗)  0.535 0.110 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the effects of institutions on economic complexity. Continent 
dummies are binary variables for Africa, America, Europe and Asia (Oceania is the base group). The 𝛿 
statistic captures how large the amount of selection on unobservables, relative to that on observables, 
needs to be in order to attenuate the coefficients on institutions towards zero. Conditional on 
proportional selection (𝛿 = 1),  𝛽∗ would equate to the bias-adjusted impact of institutions on ECI if I 
were to account for all unobserved confounders. An intercept, omitted for brevity, is included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 





Table 2. The effects of institutional quality on economic complexity, IV-2SLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dep_var: ECI 
EFW 1.593*** 1.351*** 1.146*** 
 (0.209) (0.165) (0.262) 
Mean elevation  -0.042 -0.087 
  (0.269) (0.232) 
Distance to the nearest waterways  0.021 -0.067 
  (0.287) (0.227) 
Landlocked dummy  -0.004 -0.030 
  (0.344) (0.293) 
Land suitability for agriculture  -0.513 -0.266 
  (0.344) (0.351) 
Arable land  0.014** 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dep_var: EFW 
Log (UV-R) -0.815*** -1.069*** -1.158*** 
 (0.117) (0.130) (0.235) 
Panel C. Additional information 
Continent dummies No No Yes 
Observations 108 99 99 
First-stage F-statistic of excluded instrument 48.42 67.43 24.10 
First-stage R-squared 0.257 0.384 0.496 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  116.46 80.67 19.10 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test 36.77 47.18 18.21 
Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals [1.28, 2.11] [1.07, 1.72] [0.70, 1.79] 
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the effects of institutions on economic complexity. The first-
stage F-statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013) is suggestive of the relevance of the instrument. Anderson-
Rubin identification-robust confidence intervals are the bound estimates of the effects of institutions on 
economic complexity, regardless of the strength of the instrument (Andrews et al., 2019). Robust 





Table 3. Using alternative instrumental variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dep_var: ECI 
EFW 1.592*** 1.048*** 1.148*** 
 (0.547) (0.274) (0.262) 
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dep_var: EFW 
Log of settlers’ mortality -0.239**  -0.177* 
 (0.113)  (0.093) 
Log (UV-R)  -1.414*** -1.166** 
  (0.417) (0.434) 
Panel C. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53 52 52 
First-stage F-statistic of excluded instrument 4.47 11.48 7.87 
First-stage R-squared 0.457 0.567 0.586 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  17.08 18.38 20.34 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test 2.85 10.82 6.47 
Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals [0.52, 2.66] [0.64, 1.94] [0.82, 2.35] 
Over-id [p-value]   0.316 
Notes: This table replicates the baseline IV regressions using alternative instrument sets. Over-id is the 
test for the validity of over-identifying restrictions, and failure to reject the null hypothesis provides 
some support for the exclusion restriction. Geographic controls stand for all geographic characteristics 
included in the main regression, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Using alternative measures of institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. OLS estimates. Dep_var: ECI 
Rule of Law 0.597*** (0.078)    
Control of Corruption  0.601*** (0.074)   
Government Effectiveness   0.672*** (0.075)  
Voice & Accountability    0.551*** (0.099) 
Panel B. Second-stage (IV-2SLS) estimates. Dep_var: ECI 
Rule of Law 0.749*** (0.127)    
Control of Corruption  0.739*** (0.127)   
Government Effectiveness   0.808*** (0.124)  
Voice & Accountability    1.115*** (0.266) 
Panel C. First-stage (IV-2SLS estimates). Dep_var: alternative measures of institutions 
Log(UV-R) -1.784*** (0.276) -1.809*** (0.277) -1.655*** (0.267) -1.198*** (0.263) 
Panel D. Additional information 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 106 106 106 106 
First-stage F-statistic 41.71 42.52 38.26 20.80 
First-stage R-squared 0.591 0.611 0.579 0.586 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  19.91 19.91 19.91 19.91 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test 41.56 43.31 37.92 19.48 
Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals [0.51, 1.01] [0.50, 1.00] [0.57, 1.06] [0.72, 1.82] 
Notes: This table replicates the main analysis using alternative measures of institutions, obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. Higher 
values of these variables correspond to better institutions. The World Bank’s indices of rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and voice 
& accountability are adopted in Columns (1) to (4), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 




Table 5. Plausibly exogenous IV estimates of the effects of institutions on economic complexity 
Measures of institutions 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
EFW  Rule of Law  Control of Corruption  Government Effectiveness  Voice & Accountability 
Panel A. IV estimates. Dep_var: ECI 
Institutions 1.146***  0.749***  0.739***  0.808***  1.115*** 
 (0.262)  (0.127)  (0.127)  (0.124)  (0.266) 
Panel B. 95% confidence intervals for institutions under 𝛾 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝛿2)  
CI (2𝛿 = 20%) [0.960, 2.348]  [0.805, 1.524]  [0.807, 1.591]  [0.837, 1.588]  [0.820, 1.790] 
CI (2𝛿 = 40%) [0.727, 2.696]  [0.691, 1.677]  [0.697, 1.750]  [0.710, 1.760]  [0.630, 2.045] 
CI (2𝛿 = 60%) [0.479, 3.048]  [0.575, 1.830]  [0.583, 1.910]  [0.577, 1.934]   [0.431, 2.303] 
CI (2𝛿 = 80%) [0.211, 3.401]  [0.453, 1.985]  [0.465, 2.071]  [0.439, 2.108]  [0.219, 2.563] 
CI (2𝛿 = 100%) [-0.080, 3.755]  [0.326, 2.141]  [0.341, 2.233]  [0.293, 2.285]  [-0.005, 2.823]  
Geographic controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Continent dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 108  114  114  114  114 
Notes: This table reports lower bound and upper bound estimates of the effects of the exogenous component of institutions, created by exposure to UV-R, on 
economic complexity allowing for different degrees of deviations from the exogeneity condition, following Conley et al. (2012). More specifically, CI (2𝛿 = 
p%) corresponds to the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient on institutions allowing for the direct contribution of the instrument (UV-R) to 
the outcome variable to be up to p% of the marginal effects of institutions on complexity in the main IV analysis. These intervals are constructed using the main 
IV estimates reported in Tables 2 and 4, and they are reproduced in Panel A of this table for ease of comparison. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. The roles of institutions and human capital in driving economic complexity 
 
Second-stage estimates  First-stage estimates 
(1)  (3) (4) 
Dep_var ECI  EFW Human capital 
EFW 1.769*    
 (0.964)    
Human capital -3.412    
 (5.962)    
Log (UV-R)   -1.020** -0.224*** 
   (0.401) (0.050) 
Log of settlers’ mortality   -0.196** -0.011 
   (0.089) (0.011) 
Geographic controls Yes  Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 50  50 50 
First-stage F-statistic   7.41 14.53 
First-stage R-squared   0.656 0.814 
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the effects of institutions and human capital on economic 
complexity. The quality of human capital is the World Bank’s index of human capital accumulation 
(Kraay, 2019). I account for endogeneity concerns by instrumenting both EFW and human capital by 
exposure to UV-R and the settlers’ mortality rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
